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A PliiLOSPEIC SOLUTION OF

JOim AlJTE01JY

A

:::Armc~;,

S. J.

Thesis Subnitted To Loyola 0niversity

In Partial Fulfillment Cf The 2equ!remen t::: For Tho .Uegree Of

~.:aster

Of

~~r

ts.

Vita ;,.uc tor is

Jol':n A. ::ardon, ::. J.,

Vl&.S

born in ~.:idl~::tnd, Pennsylvania,

Jlu1e 18, 1914. ~Ie received his elemer~tary training for the

fir3t tbree -yearo at St. '.·rendelin 1 s ?arish 2chool in Cleveland,
Chio and a.t St. :,~ichael 1 s ~::chool in the same city for the next
five years. Ias bigh-school training was received at Cathedral
Latin Iligh, in Cleveland. ~·.fter four yearo'undergracJuate work
at J·ohn Carroll l.·niversity, he was graduated with tr:e dee:;ree
of Bache lor of i~r ts in Fhilos ophy. 'I' his was in June, l90b.
The following September, he entered Sacred Heart :;.;ovltiate of
the Society of Jesus in l~.. ilford, Ohio. Until .Aw;ust, 1939, he
took the ret;ular :t:ovi tia te an'1 J'...:.~d.ora te courses in :;:..a t:in and
Greek from ~~avier 1Jniversity. 'Ihen, for tvw yeflrs, he continued his study of 2r~ih>sophy at '"!est J.:,ad~:Fl Colle,:,:e, Indiana, in
the Graduate ScL:rool of :;:,oyola :Jniversi ty.
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CEaPTEE I
Introductory

There is no limit to the range of man's intellect. Ee can
t!':linl-:::

of what is possible and what is impossible with equal

facility. Ee can buildup whole s·yster.J.s of thought on either of
t.hese; and, by a mysterious dispensation of r'rovidence, he can
oelieve and act upon the impossible. No other explanation will
account for tte phenonenon wLere man denies the deepest truths
of his beinc, unless .• e realize tL.a.t r.is mind is "capacious of
all things." So it is with immo:r·tality. Historians tell us that
of all the truths which are the conuJon possession of every people, two especiaily are most widespread and deeply rooted in
t~e

hearts of men:

~There

i3 a God

~ho

is the

Gupr~me

Lord of

creatioil;" and "Therf:l is an endless life after deatr., wher'e the
good are re·aarded a.::1d tLe wicked punished. 11 ..:i.nd :vet, men have
dared to deny both of these trutbs. The

SU~JStance

of

u~e

study

'.vLich follovJs will oe to presuppose tbe first of these and to
prove the second. Our pr'oof will be more than an at tempt to
show how reasonable it is to believe in man's irrn;1ortalit:y; it
will be a convinc·Lng

demon~tration

from reason that we must

admit a l:Lfe after dea t}1 if we are to retain confidence in the
:first principle::; of human

J..~nowleu;,;e.

2.

Cll:.i.P'l'ER II
His tory Of The Problem Cf Ir:11nor tali ty

':Je might go througb tLe ·:vhole his tory of philosophic

thout,J; t, from ':;:'Lalo:::; dovm to our m'!n clay, and review
out~'tandin

s 1;eeula:::ors .Ln eae: . .

cent~AJ.·;y

wl~.u t

the

belcl and tu't.'f:ht on the

question of l."!:l.n 1 s futLAre life. 3ut tbat would be too deta5.led
for

Ol.U'

pre3ent

~)urpoce.

Our s tu.dy of' the problem is itself a

speculative treatise. 'Dy way of historical intr·oduction, we
shall

Otl

satisfied with quoting and conirnentines on a few re-

presentative men who bave dealt with our problem at d:U'ferent
stat,:es in the progr·ess of human th.::n::.ght.
J:;lato is the first of these. Eis writing:::; are filled with
proved and unproved statements on tLe reality of man's im1H0rta:ity. At times he seems to waver betwe3n conviction and
belief, :mt even then we ma;r interpret his ninrl in favol" of
conviction on the strength of otber passae::es in

r~.is

workn. rt

typical instance of his wavering attitude occu1'S during Socrates' clo:::in[: S;:>eech t:'J the jury. Hothinr: moved by the sentence
o;· death, the c ond0ra::1a ticm ae tually eneourage :1 him to vent l'is

mind on the insignificance ::;;f dea tl: and the hope of an e terrHll
life.
1

the

7il:at would not a man t;ive, o Jud£:::es, to speak with
learJer of the Trojan expedition, or Odysseus,

gre~=tt

3.
or Sisyphus, or numberless oti:.ers':' '."!hat infinite delight
in convarsing with thew and asking them questions. :n
another world the~ do not put a man to death for asking
questions. i'or, oesides 'Jeinc happiel" t:1e.n we are, they
will be iru;ortal, if what iu said is true. 1 1
2is rucord of a conversatioh between
il. then~_e.n friends in the dialogue

l)haec~o

~aerates

and

son~

clear l:y shows how

certain Plato must have been ti-at irrn::ortality ls proveable to
reason.
'Socrates: '.7hen death attacks s. man, the mortal portion
of him may be said to die, but the inuaortal retires at
t!le arpro~tcb of rJea th anrJ is preserved safe and sound.
Ceoes: 'l:'rue.
:::ocrates: Then, ·:::oocs, 'oeyo'1.d question, the soul is 1mnor tal and ir"perishable, and our souls vlill truly exist
in anotter world.
Ceues: Iam convinced, Socrates, and have no further objections to mak&.
,Simr:lias: I hrwe nothing more to say ei t:1er; nor can I
see any re2.son for doubtine:; alJout the matter after what
has been said. Still, I CE'.rhtot hel) feeling a bit uncertair:. when I thi.nk of 'he greatness of the subject and
the feenleness of man.
tes: ~:es' Si:mr.:l.ias' that is we 11 s&id; anr:l :r may add
that first principles, even when the~ appear certain,
should be ~e.rofully considered. '.::·hen, wLen tbey are
sa tis:c'ac toril;! a3certained, yov rna;y follov,r tl~.e course of
t:-,e arcmnent with a SOl" t of hesitating con:c'icionce in
huraan r·e a son. Eowever, once the argument is perfectly
clear, ti1ere wi:;tl be no need for any further inquiry.'~
r~0Cr·a

Perhaps Aristotle was too intent on man's present life
to give much attention to whe.t becomes of his soul after ueath.
:he r:hiloaopher 1 s reali::n:l is in ::;tr,lr:.ge contrast to the ideali~n

of :21a to. It is no wonrler, then, that .t..r•is to tlc 3houlr1

confine e.lrnos t his entire study of the idea]_ part of man, his

rational sonl, to the lirrlits of an ear·thly exj. stonce. Iris rt.Jferences even to the possioility of a life after death are

ments on tLe separate existence of tr"e human intellect, all of
'."r~~1id•

allow of cor:>tradictory interpretation.
'Je have a good example of ..;.ristotle 1 s uncertaint:;r in t·uo

apart from each other but very difficult to reconcile.
In the t!1.lrd book, he is discussine tbe

p:t,~)blem

of "choice-

maki_ngrt and elimina tine, one by one, the claims that choice is
appetite, anger, wish, or a kind of opinion. After dismissinc
the first two, he continues:
J3ut neither is it wish, though it seems to be nenr
it; for choice cannot be related to impossibles, and if
anyone said that he chose them, he would be foolish; but
th.ere may be & wish for imponsii)les, as for immortality. 1 3
1

'?hen, in the tenth book, he is

describin~:s

the nature of

happiness and showing how true happiness must co1:.sist in a
life of contenljlu tion. Ee leaves no roCJm for any doubt here.
1 I:C the attributes of intellectual activitv are found
t·~ be self-suff'ic:iency, leisureline3s, and such freedom

from I·atigue as is possiole for ~an, and all tbe otl-:..eP
attributes of olessednes:-~; it f,1llow::: that it is tl-:..e activity of the intellect whicb constitutes complete human
hapj)iness - providecl it be granted a complete span of
life, I' or no thi nt~: that be longc to ha pnine s s can be inc omplete.
:uch a life as this, Lowe,rer, \7ill be higher ttan
the hwnan level: not invirtue of Lis h~nanit~ will a man
achieve it, \!ut in virtue of somethinc; within hir:r,ns it
were, divine. ~:.nd o~r as mucll as this some thine i.::; ouperior
to 11is compooite nature, b:I so much is its activity
superior to the exercise of other forms of virtue. If,
then, the i.ntellect; in ;;.;omethin~~ dJvine in compar:ison

o.
vJ'ith man, so is the life of the intelJ..ect divine -~)y
comparison with his hLunan life. :i~or ou~~ht we to obey
those who enjoin that n man should have man's thouchts,
and a mortal the thouphts of mortality; but we ought,
as far as possible, achieve imnortality and do all that
man may to lj_ve in accord 'Nitr tl~e hip:hest tbJng wit;hj_n
him; for, though this be small in bulk, in power and
vali'.f) it surpasses· all ti.1e rest. 1 4

Tbe coming o.C

OlU'

:Gord di v:. do s ti"ie li ve3 of the pagan

and the Cbri s tian Plato almost to a yen.r. ?la to was oorn 42?
years before Cr.•ris t; St.

AUC'llS

tine died Just 430 years after

Christ. Anu if we were looking for sor.1e doc trine of philosophy to epitomize the differences between Paganism and
Christianity, we could hal"dly find a better instance than the
r:logma of immortality.
:.~·ounded

i ble.

St. ).. ugustine adva,lces man;y u.:::.".::_;DJ't10!1ts,

on reason, to 1n·ove that man's soul is indestruct-

·~·-~;o

complete treatises on the !1mi1or tali ty and the

'<-,:.uanti ty oz t!-te ::oul, are ca talO[J'Ues of su.cL argur1entn. ::::owever,

wLe~

he comes to rationalize on these reaGonings, we

are permitted to read Yvhat

soo~s

to be h:;_::; tr-ue mind on the

question.
vne book

,·)efoN~

the end of his long thy tractate on the

happiness. Ire fir!::t points out how irconceiveable i:> real
happiness without the element of permanence. Then he makes
an important observation on the possioilit-;y- of a natural
proof for in:::--_ortali ty.
.All tho no vvlio already are e>r who s i ~1cerel:y desire
to oo happy, cannot help wishinc: to be ircr1ortal. ~"..man
certainly not leading a happy life if he is deprived
or· what he want8; c.::>rj,sequently, no life can oe tr•uly
1

G.
beatific unleos it is everlasting.
It is no smell p•oblem,. thoug;h, to decide wLe ther
human nature alone arr•i ve at the knowledge of \lrha t it
spont<:lr;.e::lusly concodes i3 ueGil"'a~le. 0nc~J :cai th enters
in, that. ?ai th which io in tr~oae to whor.1 Jesus· ha.:J ,e::;ivea to bec;)me the sons of (-'od, then no fur·ther qt::.estion
is possi')le. Granted ttat many lJGD.etrt~tlne; thinkers
have t::."'ied, t!:J.l•::rugb yeu:rs of car•::ful speculation~ to
:-::.l7o tbe pr'Jhle:m of hu.man ir:r.lO:;:'tali ty iJy 1J.rhuments
(ira·N:l ~·ro.:::i reason, a:1:l J:~1a t tl:o~r ~uere able to conclutle
to the immortality cf th8 sot::.l alone, still, th.ey never
proved that this life of happiness in stable and therefore truly beatifyinb• TLeir reasonings led them to Sf;...J
the. t the ''l cru.l re t1,;..1:t.:.~ to thtJ J:li ~er :tes of thi3 life af Lor
attaining l.Jeatitude • .i.;ut 3ven thooe who knev1 better and
believed t~at the 80-..:l :.ee;dainc, cleansed t:mcl bodiless,
in endless happiness_, yet had suer. . unroaso~-:able ideas
about tb.e ete.cnity of the worl-:~. tl<>.t ~he;; eq"t;.ivaler. . tly
~c~icd their ori~inul ~octrine a~out the s~ul.
C1.:r ::-'aith, on tJ:;:c otLe:r l:and, p:ccuic.;o3 11::.: tLut !}Je
',i;:tolG lJW.n, "uoriy and. scul, w~.ll Lo immortal anc1. ::::c, tr-..~.ly
:..La_ppy. It ~-·~ & p.2:~1~i~o ·:Jh.icr. docs 11.ct ~r·nst on ti·~Lo l~oa
son~.;:~.::;s o:' r.1en out on t!:e a.uthor:tt;y of Cod. 1 G

or

irr. r;:ortality must have cloc.::::-·ed itself of a c;ro;;...t

1.. un;y-

:-;oul incou.·t::.ptible?l! ::o gives no less than el·3·;rt:m argu1aonts
Ge11tilo~.

he interpr•<'.Jts the fhilosopher's words on tl:e

cu:ctuin .L'onns continuing to c:xis t a.ftor

t~·;:;

~orne

of

possibilit~·

of

clissolut:tun of

wol'dS clcar.i:y :JilOW tht:t, altt.ougb. l::e
called the scnl a form., yo t, :,;,o u:~ver c.;laimed th;J. t it
was nat sub::::istent and consequentl~ corrup~ible.
Aristotle e:xcluded the :!.nt;c:lligent ::;oul from the
'i~r1.ctotle

1~

e:,er~erali t:r of terms, calling it a special k:!.n<i of cuo:: tar:ee ui~ict c 0:1 ti nue:::; e.xis tir . .g a.fl~or· se pti:ca. t5. vt:.. .fJ•o:rr. the

uol!.y.

6

1

co.scu on the arg:..urH3Lts of' St. '.::houao. It is sufficient,

r· ore,

7.

tLere-

to indicate here onl;y how !"lli'C he 'Nu~ of the quos Lion on.

Nltional grounJ:::. Later· oa, we :::Lall see bovv far he went to
pr·ove r:..o t only the possj_Oili ty out tLo fact of an c ternb.l lift;.

~l.nd

now, just before enter·i n~; on the inquir-y i t;::elf, we

can profitabl9 read a few linen from ~r. Suarez to realize hov
ccnvincerJ .Sctola"ltic philosophers ba':!'G bocom0, ::-~.nee ;'t. ':'homo.l'!' cla:T, on t:::.o doctrir>.e

,

o::

man's

iii:tulOl

tc::..li ty.

'I c1c;1y tho a8GUJ~pt"'.c:: t~:::;.L; ;;u ~u.·.,ro no ccr·trd.n pr.J0f for
ot,.;,r in~.~01· tali t-y. .".. nil ro.ora thar_ thu t, there are man-y and.
convincing proofr: whicl-:. cr.: taLllsL. irrl!l"02.' tc..Jj_ ty. Some of
them, .vhtc~: s~"'01.".' that tLe ::.Hml is in;ma teri&.l and ther~efore
j_rll.l!Ol""tal, ar·e taker: :':;:om tl-:-<; o1-:J:;:·b.t~0•1::: of' th; .spcculattvc
~.ntcll;;;;c~t. Ctl-.:.er;~ aJ..~c dnnvn irOlil tl::0 aL:ts of tl:e prnct:i.cal
intellect - espcc~ally tn thu rcncrse o:' conscience, the
dictate of COlVlcjcnce to u.ct mor<":~.l1.Y tl 1 ;cin3t the r•ciJeli.ion
0 ,.. t"'e ~t,O''""-· a'Y"lu'' +-o c1a"'~"'z0 ~,.~,--. ·"'"'0""1 e~·,-,n.,.c
thr>
:,,..,d.,.
+-o
J::-" "-'
~
-.J
de&th, if ncocl 'vo. ':!tj.ll cU.fferont ar·gt.rwnts aro :'::n.md h:
trc a:'fect:.:::J.c of the ·.·::111, wl::!.ci:. can have no r·est except
ia ~;od, -.;;t.1.cl" fehJ-s, '0-:/ tLe sLoer itlpl:lsc of ito natu.re,
tLe pu.ni:shrr.ent in an after-life, and desires that happiness whic~ it does noL find on earth.' 7
,;_

..,J.

,

-

c_l ,l.;.

..._...,

V

...,.J,.

•

'

V-

"-'

V

V

J J

J\,

,j

J ""-"

U """

L.r

8.

Ha turE

li..nd.

b:f:L6C ts 01

r

:ua nt.:i. ty In J3odies

If wo cou.lU. under·stan6., b;{ a kiLd. of intuition, the natur·e

of a spi:i.·it, -,.Je snoulcl not bave to tso bt;yonu a par·agraph to solve
the :proble;u of this treatise. As a matte1' of 1uut, vve nave nc
l·eally intuit i vc kr..o .. le clge of ar:..;./thi.nc ir1 tnis 'i;Oll.d; <.:-1 thOil6h
om· nearest approach to tr1is is tne knowlcJ.2,e that v;e hsve of
[;1G.'~C.1:ial.

bo·1ies. If v;e :;:;ne\'1 v'lhat. a :Jpirit is, a:.:: easily and

completely ad we kno·., the r::.l Lure of a body,
::;u~' t~w.t

even \'Jhen these:. tr1o

a:r·~::;

'lie

could ia!.:e6.iately

u.uited. into ow:7 Sl.lbstance, che

spirit is so inuc:pendent of the body that, whatever n.a..,pens to

the latter, Jche for'l!l€1' ·.·Jil:. remalu s-u.18tunl;i&lly ·i.lnuffectiGd.
As is is though, all

OU.I:

first r.anC:. infor·mat ion is about

bodies. Ou1• earliest experience has been v;ith material, concrete:. realities.

:;;;very~vhere

around us, wtutever· r,e touch, see,

or r1car is matter and body. :;:.'he mar·vcl is that
i1ave

ccn~e

to knO'u anything else t;mn

11

:18

should. ever·

the 'Julk of boclies. 11

:;:n thE.- cour·se of our study, we shall G.iscover that jus·c ti.iz
powei' to uttain to th

kno;~ledge

o:L tihin{;3 othe1 than 'Jod.ies

t<i ve s us the cJ.t:ar est insir:;h t i..v1 to the nature of spiritual
be in,; •

.At the ul<.tset, ·, e mi,:,nt siupl:J call

.:.t

syirit sometnint;

ths.t is bodiless, and thun fs'D on tu describe t;nt: activiti3b of a

~-

spirit like t

h3 hllr.Bl:i.

::Dul. Uur rlescr-iption 'NOU..ld Clescri'oe bu.t it

.1oul<l not prove li he char·ac ter of L".an 's des t

in~r.

.J e

need. more than

a descr·iption of s:pirtual su·ostance to see how man at;t.ins D.is
iestiny and v1hy he must at .:.;a in it in one '-lvay and no other. Conse,1.u.cntly, we may not assume the radical de.aial of icientity bet~~een
E".

matter

anc~.

spirit, but must invest if1'l, tE- v.hetner· there is

differ·ence between them at all and vvhether it is so great that

each reality is capable of existence apart from the other.
':Cher'e is a clue to the method of our investiga ti.').n in calline; u Bpirit something bodiless. l:et us fir·st understand. clearly
anci exhaustively the nature of a body am:. then, if we come upon
an entity wi1ich

sh011S

noth ill 0Y; uodily in its makeup, we

8.1'

e be-

,r::imling t.o handle the substance callea a spirit.
Off hand, there see ins to be an endleos diff icu..l ty in t:r:ying
to get a clear notion of the ultimate nature Qf

1~tter

or body -

Llnclerstanding by its ultimate nature, the last physical constituent whic[1 is comlilon to every bod;-,r. Ther· e

i~3

such a variet;y of

corporeal things. No two of them have the same ;:;ha:pe,
color • .:Jome are ver·,;y lar,Q'e.
by the nakeG eye. 'f.lhen,

~',lOSt

wei~ht,

or

of them are too small to be seen

too, we are so -.v ell acquainted with them

tiu:,t whatever they nave in common is liable to escape us because
01.1.::

:pr&ctical use of material things d. e:pends rather on knovdng

their surface d.iffuences than their inner so.meness.
But here, as anyr1here in the study of ;,hilosophy, we must
sLa rt from ex-perience and then, by classifying the do. ta found..,

10.
i.aduc e

bene ra.l :princi:pl e to ace ount for this ex :per iuen tial in-

&

forruation.

For·tunatel~r,

notion which

peo~la

v;e can begin bJ rel;J'in2: ou the correct

have about bodies. Let us uall this a spoL-

taneous oonLon con::;ent on

~·~(u;.t

constitute;:; a boJ;y, or· one of

those na G".._ral jucigrnen t s demt:cmG. eJ. for tte basis of all know0

c>..r'e to be cr'edit8d Itith rational convictioLs.

il..ccor<tingl;;r, we begin i.J:y examinil'lt!; as

n:an~r

&!1c1 dif.1erent

kinds of thin,;;;:, as possible '.1l1ich are t;eue:;,:ally ca:led bocl.ies.
,.e are not concerned here witil

~ny

source of movement cr· genera-

"

tion vmioh these bodies ma;y pos;::ess an:i b::· reason vi which we
JGnside:c them li v inp,. 'Tne c oncentr· at ion is upon iJodics as
such- ph:)'Sical, n-:tural, solid bodies. ".rld. what d.o we find?
·rhe vast bulk of the visible universe falls ur:der this
classification ....,. fev; feet belovJ tile crust of

t~1e

e&rth, organ-

ic life is r&r·ely found, E:.rui then only in vvat2r·, v,ner·e oxyger,;,

may be hall at least in :Jolu.tion.

;~o

the Sll.l'1ace o.f the earth, lifeless

again, a fer/ ::!::eet above
mat~ce:c

- synon;rmous with

ou1· :p1·esent definition o:L body, is the onl;:; l:inJ. of realit;yk~ovm

to

c:.n..r~erL;e.ntt~l

='nere is
S)t:

n~)

scie.r:ce.

need detailiEi.:; a lone; list of these diffe.:;_•ent

ciee:' of bod.ies ::.:,wl st1·ipp in;? th0rll cf thE;ir uncom.lJOn pro-

eomuon. Tne anc.l;;Tsis iJ too easy. -"11 borlies have q_uanti ty.

radioactive emu;.1Cltions - ull

r~ave

11.
q_uantit;y, i.e., all of tht:m

sho·,;, o.ae or more ':..uantita tivt:; jn·o:purties 'Mlich ·vvill be mor·e
clearly de3cribed

ls~er

on.

~his

truism is variously expressed

b:; St. Thomas.
'r-;o bod;::,r is found tc contc..in .:.:..n~)'thine.~ except 1J;y
.:1uantitative ::;orruensuration. 1 ••••• 1-.. bod;y. is a ::livisible,
oontinuous thing. 2 ••••• J.;;ver·;y budji has ti1..Cf:-e dimensions,
le!J6'.;r. . , b::8adth am depth.' 3
Eowever, it is .,iell to

~~ecp

in mind tnat this peculiar

property co;unon to all bodies does not make them what they are.
Quantity does not, in itself, constitute a body ..... measureable
u.ni t ot matter, ss.;{ a crystal of quartz, is not a body because
i";i has ti.1e proper·ties of size, welght and surface. These can

all be made to vary under certain conditions while the substance, that is, the

homogeneou~,

self sufticient unit, will

remain tn0 same. The only inference we draw at this :point is
that

v~he::.·ever

we :Lind a body we sm.:.ll invariable find. Y..uantity;

and what is more impor-..ant, wherever ·,'Je have ll.uantity "''e always have either a body or at least sor11ething bodily •
.i.i.l though it is not strictly necessary for

the advance of

our proof, we might use this common pr·operty to formulate a
good definition of bodily subst&nue. On the basis of a constant
experienoe that certe.in substances are ueve1·, naturally, without a common accident, we .may logically t:trgue the.t these substances h&v e a natural aptitude or demand for· t nis auu ident.
In the prevailing order of th1ngs, they uannot exist without it •
.A.n,l <:..11 the substances tba t ··;e call bodies are bound up with

lZ.

an accident, neve::theless

·No

have

c.t

:per·.Lect right to ucEine

bodily substo.:1ce as any self suboistent unit \vhich is bound up
with y_uantity. St. Thomas

come~3

cloGe to givin(; u;:; the defini-

t ion in so muny v1ord s when he compares ."-v..e:mt i ty vJi th corpor; eal

suhsL1nce:.
T

Of ail

tr1 e aoc iC.t:nts, q_uantit.;.r is t i:le near· est to a

subs tunce • T '±
.,e ar·e not particulal'ly interesteu, thougn, in formulating
a cief ini tion fol' bodil;/ subst ::me a.
t.1e ird:;LJatc nature of

qu~::..ntit;:r

.:e

N

isn ouly to tmders tand

and. see how inextricabl7

liru:eJ. it i3 wi tt1 every physical body.
1~cwer

roc.lly

tr·ic~

becau.se it is suctJ. c. p::::imary

t~1ing.

If ever· nto ;::ee is to

Fhilosa-pher;s

~1ave

q_uantit~/

to cleline

.«cnow" was tr·ue, it cert[:dnl;/ is in thL:; case. 0till,
better ap:p1•eolate

~lOW

:uuch the concept of

~uar~ti ty

y;e

shall

inulucies

b;r :r:evie·,,in_:"'; some of the ·.. ays in v:hior~ t;hc reslit.J of y_--..w.ntity
f[JL·..Gifests

itself.

h.11Y

one of these ::r.a.odes of

u~D..e;.ntit;,r

:loubl8 in:iex: first to t!:le inherence of q_uantity in a
st&nce

an~.

11

is a
S"2D-

then, to t'.1e natu12 of the subst&nce itaelf.

The r:1ost ;:;cnGl'ic fcrr:u

,-sy

fi~1ich

c::.uaHti ty

ass·J.me~;

ia 6:xtension

cvntirru.ousneJs 01 exL:.nsion, I deEHl: ca:pabls of
oe in::'< d i vi d.E:: d in to pa1 -~ s tn& t can ir.. the il· t1LTn be

1~.

sorrtething \'ihict: is

~Lisposeci

~,o

bei.!Jf; u.iv id.e6. :: ·:1to a teoretics.::..-

pa3sive or receptive sic:e of n.separ·atior:. ir..bo par'ts" • .:;;o -GhuJ..;

,r. . ilc a sHbst&nce i2 still actmlly Dne
.::.ivLJiblc, it

of

C..ivisior~

:.:~lone,

i~~

saiC:.

to bb ext0nded. or·

an,~

u_n,~ividcci

out

contin~J.Ous.

into :par·ts an:l. concentrlite on 'chis

c~lC.\l"ti.cter·istic

v.J are tre&tir.:,_; tiLE:: ij_visibility V1l:iicl1 accorq:.a.nies

ro~.uantity.

\,ithout c;_uantity, ther·e is no Civision in to6.ies.

'·,hen '"uan t i\'l is r• erj:ove d,
inC.:.ivisible. 1 6

t;V er· y

1.Jody, limestone, fu:::: exarnyle, unle :Js this

s 1.1b s bane e b o cow:;::;

!-~od.y

pc ;_,~, er-3 ed.

c,Lantity v.e co·.:J.s. never' d:rJ..plicete; tv.o inclivic;_w:.tL.: of tne same
i.:..•.'J:ST;ancc

anyvJclc.~.·e

.ould. be .s.n isolate

in the universe. "c cr·..:.Jtal o:L thi3 SL.i.tJ.Jtance

C:.i.ltity, cc.,__'l_ple tel;'/ ,:.;_if_ er·e.:.1t in

:1ctiL:..·..:~

anC.

o: t ne s&uiu cL1emic;&l m::. turc ar·e mul tipli.erl t<.:i iaC.i v id.\,jl.t.ls by

''i_uantit;y, ·,_:lich t~;iveG d.ir:lE:lk'Jions, 2-J tne o·<J..y thint;
whicn, by ita nc.ture, cau3e s ths r::rultiplicd t1on .1
inli.vic-;.-w..;.ls in th'..: sa;Je s:pecies of no.'cural .:m.~:::tarJcec. 1 7

14.
Aristotle d.czcrites a tl1ird effect of c;_uantit;y U}..Jon the
su'cutancE:- q_uantified, v;llich :tolloYJ.S olose 1:.~~-.m ths first two

is reall~c peculio.....:· to i.:i..UCEtit:i.es i::; that ',\0
or 00.c.1tras t t bem in terms or on {,r·ound.3 of e~-c~E:l
ity. Gne .:::o:.:L··~ :i.3 eu,_uo.l to ano'uc . . 8l'; &~ot!:J.e1·, pc:· co.1tr·c:-,
is Ull8L.:ual. Uf 1wt nir.. :: save 'lu.an ti ty ua~1 v1e af::... irm tLEJ 30
t·.-vo ~el'I11S1 20 that ou.r callin,,:, souetrdnt:; eu_1.>.al or uney_c,,_;,l is Jul;.c mark, <... bov0 all r:.al'x,_3, o:L y_u..antity.' 8
1

J{lB.t

JOlr~:;~:rc

:~o.'J

necesi:iuril:· thi2

1

•••

txai~

n;oasru·e. i:

is rcuognizet.

1

i.3 liritceL~ .. i ti1 VJ':.~.dteve"J

is q"LLanti-

tnat b;y· ·.• ~den the q_uauGity of a t:1ing

~

·;;rlictl are not so Ln.~ortant &s th8 r.~n::•Jeding but IJhicr1 maJ help
·J.s to t;:r:as_p tL1e

1

'subst<. d1ce 11 o:f an u.nc1uantified a.ncl spiritual

naGure; whatave:::· can be

rffiaS'L..l'E.cl

does not allor o:::: cont:r'2}:isc

:::_uantiGies neve:;.: hav£::; contrdr.i.es, ior-, -~~l&t L:i not
uudt:rstoo:3. by itsel1 but mt;.st be :f>.w:·tl-.81 r·efer:::ed to som.e
standard., hO\'J can t, ,:.at i_1avc any CGli·c.:::·ar~,r? ;.:."U1Jl,JOSir;.:; we
&C'uit that Great, ::3mall c.:nd tr1e lL;:e are co.ntra:.:ios; then
it folloi'~S tJ:J.G, t; ti:e S&ElC:: sut,jeut &t one Q..l:ld. the saGle time
allows o::: cont:.-G.ry :r;ro~dl t;ies, <::..nci ·iJllings ,dll be contl·ary
to tiJ:Hasel',..;S. Ho-;, ofteL L.; ilO.pJH..l~;J ;"d""t the 38lite thing
i::.J us nxcJr1 .;rest 8.8 sr:i<:.ll. Compa1·c:: .• it~~ one thint2: it is
tjrc::..t, comp&.:i..Jl Ydth a.r.Luci.1.er· it is small.' 10
1

uO

also, y_·l.4antifiecl 211titie;::; oax1. never be spoken of as l.•o~:e

Ol'

Less
c:~uant i ty i,;:.i. no wise admits of d.egret:s. :2ake ntv;-o cubik; long," f10r· exa1nple; t:Ji2 :H.:V er· &c~Jrlit3 oJ~ ~•n.Y (.)raQ.c:,tiolls.' lJ.
1

,..

Presence Of

~.uanti

t;r :Ln BocUl_x

8o far, v;e h2 ve cons id ~red onl;;t the
9

bodily

Sl.<.bst~:;.nce

anl. 1')a1·ts which are

and

:~ffee;ts

r~J.anti tat

i ve nature of

seen tnat it has C:..irnensions, mass,

GBVe

Ll~initel~r

si6.e to our investi['"at ion oi:

LiS

divisible. This was the inductive
tter. l:ow vve shall start 'bae;k

i:rom the general :r;rinciple to lind

SOL.le

of the impl1cc.tions it

involves.
Jince every material substance possesses <iUantit;y and
every

bei4~

functions

acco.c·(tir:~;:;

~Luantity

are ,justifieC. in lookirl{ for
boLl~r

to ius own peculiar nature,

r~e

in every effect that a

produces. ':2his need not; wean "'Jhat all the properties of

'~c'l:antity

v...ill be cliscover·able in every bodily effec·c •

.;~cause

does not have to exhause its powers when it produces somet:1ing.
,ie should be satisfied to find even one !'tell-tale:· mark of

1

({u.antity to say that, Hhatever othe1' influe.r..ces e.t1tored into the
;:1aking of an effect, if there is

2.

(1.uantit2.tive tiLge to it, one

influence in its :rn•oduction was 4_Uc-=-ntified. :r;o other• ex1;lanation
woulcl account for even cl trace of quantity.
It must be <luite cle::U' b:' nov. wnere we cnc l8aclin:'; all
.;hese discussions; towards tr.c point where vJe cLn ::Jhow

t~mt

tne:r:-e is an eJ..fect produced in t.he wo1·ld of visible r·eality
·.vh.ic~l

bears none of t i.1e rrtaLk:s

tion is hur:JEtn

tno"J.~t,

the liLiiJca tiord of time

o:~

c.~.uan ti t~i

• ;p he effect in c;,ue s-

in every stage o:f its al.J;;Jt:r·action from
an~'

space.

lG.

In the meantime, though, we !-.:ave to firmly establish the
fact that there is quantity not only in every body as a ::::ub:::;tb.ncc, but also in every product in whose making a body has
had its share.

We need not stop to examine the obvious fact

tl:,a t ev~r'y activity of a upure body 11 ta s quantitative pl'O_pGr-

ties.

Another name for this kind of activity is ener•gy, where

tho axiom on

ti~e

conservation of energy in a closed system

immediately suggests itself.

Every body emanation - synonymous

witL energ:,r, has a measureable weight and ::rizc; or, at least

its transit

tlroLc~

space allows us to measure its movement.

About tr:e passi'Je proper·ties of gross bodies, it is enough to
recall such s tundards o.s liter, gram, and centimeter, to adr.1i t
the quantitative ct·aracter of a body in its receptive capacity.
The real pr o"Llem, however, has to do with the nature of

those activities wr.dcl: do not proceed from a "pm.,e body. u
cporations aml products of
tl ve properties?

livi:1r~

Do tl:e

bodies also exhibit quan.tita-

and, may we, therefore, conclude that even

when a body is activated from within, i.e., fr•om an interior

sol.;.:r·ce o:f

powe1~

wbich philosophers call the vi tal prir-ciple,

st:lll, the lifeless or ine1•t part of tt)eir being intimately
s "ares in the ac ti vi ty'?

We muB t give a deal of attention to this vital principle
or so·,1l of an OI•ganism, if we wi:3h to fully distinguish it
from the vitalized princ •.ple or boclJ proper.

3t. Thomas proves

in one paragraph that tnis vit&.l pr:Lnciple: 1) is not a body,

17.
2) is without quantitativt:J parts, 3) unites the separa.'ble, phys:teal parts of the ori;anisrn into a homogeneous 1e'.nit or sui.)stance.
'Every body is divisible. And •:1h.atever i:::: divisible
demands c omething to hold to;so ther and unify its parts. r 1
By part8 tere, we

chemical compounds

t~

st~ould

underntand all the varieties of

at go to form the ph:;'s ical makeup of a.

body, in ever-:y grade oi' life.

In general,

they will be carbon,

calc :turn compounds, water, and mineral salts of different kinds.
Wh.a. t St. Thoma::: is arguir:.g for is a sufficient reason to explain the marvelous coherence of a glomeration of uncommon
phynical ine;reciientr: into a conu;wn
Di

wr~ole

with a common purpo-

·;e function.

'

'If the s O\>l we1·e a body, it vr~u.ld itself need something to bind it:J parts int.J a unit, and then this other
someth:Lur: wo'.lld oe the soul. We can apprec:!.ate hov1 indispensable this binding force is, when we see a body begin
to disintegrate the moment it loGes it::: soul. F'or the
sake of argurJent, let U.''l suppose tba t the soul is a body
and that what "bomoe:e'J.lzes" the soul is some thir:..p: di visible. Well, we still cannot be satisfied until-we como
down to an indi7isible and bodiless principle which explains tl.e unity of an otherwise ununified :mixture of
:r;arts. This indivisible thing will ·oe the real soul unless we want to admit the impossible sol1..1. tion of an infinite series of unifiers and uni~ied.' 2
I:: hi:> con:ur;.Emtary on tl·.e second book of Aristotle's De
An:T.ma, St. Tl:oma.s

,~oes

to some t length to show just what the

soul is in its var;yi;:1b gr·ades o.::... perfection.

The diffic"LJ.ty

arises from the fact that physical bodies are differently
unified to form d:t fferent classes orliving beings.

He propo-

su8 the d~_fficulty to l:.i:::.self:

'3ince the soul, wl-:.ich is the:;

S:)Ul'CC

of life or move-

18.

ment, determines the VOGetatj_ve, s0nsitive and intellectual properties in different organisms, the question is
whether each of these capac:. ties is the whole soul or only
a pa. r t of it • '
Tbi3 question l"lls an important bearing on the r•e;_ation between
1ni.nd 'lnd hmnan sou.l, vvhether tLe two or identical or not.

'The vegotativ·e faculty in orc;a::-dsms capable only of gr·owth
and nutrition, an ir:~ p}.aats, is the whole soul. Howe~rel',
in organisms which have growth and sensation, the v0getative and sensitive powerG are each only a part of tl~ soul.
In general, thcr•efore, those livint: substances which possess only one of the above capacities, identify tr~is capacity with their souls. But when an organism has several of
tb.ese enere;ies, any one of them i3 rather a part of the
soul than the soul itself; with this reservation, that
the so1,1 in quest.icJ!l is called after its r.J.gLest vital energy. r 3
This classification of' organisms agrees with our daily
e.xperie nee.

Hence,

the search :for quantity in the operati ::ms of

or;c:;anic substances is simply :::•ostricted to plants, animals, and
men.

f!e need hardly

1

mo~ce

than n:ention tte evident measureable

properties o:· vegetative f1.mctions.

Tbe very fact that the high

est activ1ty of a plant so11l is upon tr.e quantity of the plant
sb011ld be enot,gh reas::m to shmv how completely dependent this
vital principle is U)on tre body it animantes.
~~

Early in the Sum

St. Thomas describes life in general:
'The name, "life, u is taken from a ce1•tain external
property possessed by certain things, namely, the c~paci
ty for self movement.' 4

Th3n, in the De Anlma, he explains the vital movement in plants:
(V'3c;etative movement is) 'the movemen.t or chan[~O in ·.vhich
the bul:~ of a uod;;· is increased or decreased ir. . all directions.' 5
Clearly, a vegetative s::>ul is so bound to the physical body it

19.
vitalizes that its whole ef'fect is spent on tr:..e body itself'.
Not only is tLere a
~mch

11

tinge of qnun ti ty.' 1 ir. . tl:_e operations of'

a soul, but the:tr entire sphere of activity is

li~ited

to

reg'J.lath•e the wss or bulk of the plant.
The v::.tal prlnciple in animals requires more careful att0ntion.
t;hP.

In animals as in plants, the soul is the o:rigin of

t spontaneo·,w a.c ti vi ty which makes for the continued per-

fee tion o1' tL.e uody it

?.nin~a

tes.

Zven a superficial e.:xamina-

tion of animal <Dganis:ms will tell us Vtnt they need o. sur;erior kind of soul because of ti1e grea tel"' complexity and delicacy of t
point.

~)e

ir !.Jodi ly s tl'UC ture.

}3-u.t let us not ue misled on this

So far as the physical body of ahimals is concerned, the

most that tt.eir souls can do for

:.t

in organized G:xistence, nourish,

m~lre

to reproduce its kind.

will be to keep this body
it grow, and allow it

In reality, 1Ve cannot separate the ani-

mu.l soul froP.l its oody, but 1.'10 can easily distinguisL the purpose v1hich its bony and soul serve in relation to each other•.
Tl:ough we might give some proof's tu

sho~v

that the vital

principle of an animal fulfills the purpose of its existence
v:l:en it

11

does all it; c an 11 to preserve and perfect the body uni-

ted to it, this will not be necessary to develop our argument.
We shall 0e satisfied to analyze only the means wr.J.ch a sensiti ve soul uses to attain its purpose.

:i~ven

less, we shall exa-

mine only the best means at its disposal for any traces of
"bodily adulterat ~.on" and make our conclusions accorctingly.
Observation tells us tbJlt sens&.tion is the hit;hest func-

t:}.on of the vital principle in aninals.
ani:nml can

f~.ad

20.
T!::r ou.sh sensa ti::-m, an

the f.:>od, o.m1 find or make the shelter it needs

vvcll the nature of sensation in

f~oneral.

Ccmsciov.s experience

&:ld the stucly of animal habits toll us that sensation means

some kind of rece:,;tion of th.tng8 fr·om the outside.
wo may say tla t the things recei iT.gd

tl~ro·J.t;h

In passing,

sensation are al-

ways re pr 3 sen ta tLms of inC::l vidFal bodily 0nt it i e;:.
of this later on.

But more

Por the pr•esent, we arc COi.'.siclering sensation

only as tho be:Jt mea!J.s that an anirual can use to fulfill the
end of its existence.
If 'lm can sho·w tr~&t sensati:Jl1, for all the "tenuousness" of
its product, the senstjle sp3cieG, is :Jtill a bodily thine,
we n:r>e in a position tc invest::.c:ate the
of abstract thought.

t~.-p:lca1ly

then

hwnan function

Ar:tst.Jtl6 civ•-;s a short desc.ript:ton of the

sensitive fT x o s s, in. ilis 2.)e 11.niraa.
1 'Jlith re.f'o:..·o·J.ce to cel:"'r:~tion in .'~;el-·.oT•aJ, wo muat under
stand that a se118e is cs.:::a ulc o~ rocei vL1g into i L:::elf se!'l3 :i. iJle :f:)r ns Hi tho ut. their no. t ter·. 1 6

ir0c.. -,e or form
•. J

in taken in •••

r just as wax t;akes into itself the mark of a rinc wit
out its iron or c:old.. It r·3cei 70 3 :l_n tu i t.sclf a t;old. Ol."'
!)l"Onze ii'lp:;."'e s 8L:m, uu t n:::,t as [:;old or bronze. In like
manner, a se"-:..3e i.s L:ipi·eJscd by every O.Jject that po:::so::;scs
color, flavo::..", or GOUllfl - not in so far as each o.C these
objects bears a given nL.:ne, out in so far as it has such
and 3UCh a quality. TLe organ of sense is fundane;ltally
that i11 \Vhich th:t.s pO\ier o:: b-:dnc-; il1ipressed exi;::,;::::. It
he.s, tl1erefore, an identity wit!1 the object th.at nu.koG the
impr.:;ssion, out tn the mode of its o;.;yression it is
different.' 7

.!e mL.y, then, de··'ine sor:sat.:!.o~1. wj_th Aristotle as:

;;i tLo~ t
11

-.vi t

J:-D u

its n1a tter.
t its matter. 11

The impor tc.:lt pr..rase in thir.: dei':Ln:i tion ls,
Hha t zloo s thi ::-; me ::..r;.?

\io hav::; a1reac.l:.; seen tlit::. t

ti:..ts

c;_ 1;ant i

21 •

the assit,i-

ty ·.vl• ich :t t alv~a;rs i

'3

ver·y o ody anu uoJJ.l-y- prouuc t

i.1 v

-:;lvo s in its makeup.

When

,d U.t:.:;ut ti:lG '_r· _,n tter, t.loc::: ho mc<Otn Lo 0xcluc1e quanti 'c-y from

3tain of

quantit~.

3C;!1:JD.tion.

kind of form i.;ha t

22.

'J:l-1e
sa~:~_Oll i s

eJ\l~l,0ncu :Jl··j_r_:·,l: u
4

tldrl£:~ l~:_r..L~

:r1 "tlie

s~~.ato o~

ce!l-

vJiG~t.\J11~~ 111a·Gtto:r·, (JUt 110t ~vitY~CJl;_t !.n.di"',.ricl1.tatin.[;,

rna te:c ":_a 1 cc nili t i

'J

n:: ••• ' 8

2 V•
""

vHA. .:'1..L: V

;,hel.·e should. vie f!P to be convinue6_ thali man's thoughts
ttr•e unt;.Ju.checl. by q_ua.:.J.Jcity'? No amount of IJhiloso:pr:..izing vdll
UOllVince us. BL...t bet;;cr· Ctlan tr·;'linr.:;

uG

pove b,y any

re&sonin.; that our· thou_,s;hts have nc

q_uantit~r,

:phc.;.nun1enon Gaki.tl.[.S place in oc_n· r:dncis. ii bit

,~i tt1

:Pl'OC8S8

of

v;e c&n see the

o~

any i:lea :::.r:. whio ~l we chose to foou..s om· &t

selr' 1·e:Lleation

.;E~ltion.

more effective vJa;.{ \dll be to follm. Jt.

}~U.t:SU.Stine

:L1·ienci i:!.vodius in the anal;ysiz tney made

toc~ether

.-,he:;:•c the _probltjm of the q_u.anti t"y- of the soul ,vaE

Bu.t a

and his
at Ca3siacum,
uu:~er

i.a:ves-

t ie:;at ion •

.i!.VOdiuJ is on tt1e thirc: o:L ilis s everl c.;_uest ions on trw
natur·e of
Cici_

-~he

s-::ml.

H~:

has al1•ea6.;y been s"'tisfied on:

n.d'J.6l·O

the soul c:onie froL1?n an:::. "•ihat h; the soul made of? 11

i:::, nm' as._inc::
~;ns,.,er

n_:..row lalgs is the s oul?n

he receiveJ,

we

;hile listening to the

uan make tne introspec;.;iun necessa1y to

understand. the un(J.uar:tified

'lmgustine:

~ie

pro_pe:;.-~;y·

of om ti:low.;hts.

;yo"J. that tL.er·e s..:ce
nothins t>n.J. jec, ;yot:.
vvill not finQ in them any :):. 'cno::;;e s 1;a t ial CJ.Ual i ties tnc.. t
you al'O lookinG, for i.E tne soul. So ·!_;:...·,..:..e is this, that you..
l:Jau,

ti~1illt:,S

~'irst, I v!ill sho'.,
~Jannot sw.y are

whic:1 ·Ne
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will l'lOt onl;y &dmi t Gh e soul to be something al thou.g;h i ~~~
has no length or other· ciimensions, but yo1:. V1ill agr·ee
·,:,i th rae iJ1at a soul is to be consid.er ec"l as much more
noble &s it has none o:L thase prOtJC:l·ties •
.i.Cvod.ius: Follo·,; an;y ord.E-1' ~ ou wish, :;: ai.tl read~/ to
lis ten and. le ::u· n.
Aurs. :2~1AriL.~ you • .But first I vvant to ma~;:,c:. su..::'e t~1.& t I
si1all not be trying to tec.ch ;;.au what you kno\1 already.
r.rhis tr·ee here- I'Li su:·e you 1 ll adLiit it is not sira}.::ly
not hin5 •
.c.vod. JIJat u.ra 11 y •
.....ug. .. ell, t .t1e n, w.1u t at o u.c jat; tic e '? .H.re y-ou. e~ually
rec:...c._,y to ad1.ait tna·c justice is SOI:JE:llt1ing even better than
the tr· ee we: are s itt inc:; under?
.c:..vot1.. :1n,/, of cou.:cse; ther·e is no coi,lparison between
the two.
Aug. You are ve1.:~ agreeable. J3ut J ee VI hat your· admis.:;ion '1{:~ms. If ·,.e sc..y th::,t thL-3 tr·ee is wur·th les3 than
:1ustice - less beond every measttre of compa.::.:·l~on, and you
g-ranted thc:t t t .he tree is not no thine:;, shoulli we concluue
that just ice itself is nothingi
.!1vod.. That would. be s tupi1lity.
Aug. It c er· w inl...v vvould. J\.1 thouch, per haps the only
rec.son ;rou sale. this tr·ee \·1as something is because it has
length, thickne~"'S, anli solic.ity, anl that if theze wer·e
tt..ken awc:..y the tree would vanish into not;hing?
..GVO(l. So it seems to me.
Aug. A.n.O. justice - <vhicn you. clair.H:;G. .vas not nothing,
or rather, that it v.as sor.Jetrlir~; far· J'1ore e:;.,cellent than
the tree ••• d.oes ,justice l:llive c.n:.r lengthZ
.Gvod. I can't even conce5_ve justice as soniething
lonB, thick o~ tae like.

Jt. Augustine goes on for· a 'Nhile,

S~10<Ninf;

his friend tno.t

Jche r1u.man soul may •Nell be son,ething reul even t:10ur;!1 it has

nons of the gross pr'O:pertie:s of size and. shap8. iiis argu.ment
so fa1· is onl;:.' b,\'

analog~r.

:;'or· our presE:nt problem

w8

are

·tc.tking onl;y- the r·eferences to abstracted. ideas, 'liher·e the:::e are
2.11Blyzed for t heii· freedom fr'cra· Cd_U&ntity.
A few minutes later, tne tv,o men resch a :point in 'GhE:ir·
ur·gUJnent v.hert! lengt!1, vvidth ancl deptn are practicc...lly, ·::n:..t
not u·u.i te, denied of the soul. ;:>t.

Aut:~us

tiine 1v2.nts to clinch

t,he ar:s·umen t.
'"mf::• .ferhaps ru;; shall be r.aorc convinced. of this fact
after• we C81.' dully invest iga tc t~1e.se L:ree notions of
lene;th, bread.th and. depth. ,.hat I should. like to have you
(;.o .~.1ow is to get an ideci of length, . .10 more, just lent..,th,
vdthout any thic~ . . ness to go \vitn lt.
Evod. :sori:y, I can't d.o it. lTo r<atter how fine the
obj<::ct I tr·y to iraagine, a S}Jider's thread, for ir.~.stance,
it alv:ays has somE: length, b::.·20.C'.th a.n:, third. climension •
.vt18.teve:-.: these y_-u.alities are, I have tc a6.mit the:J' ar·e
there •
..>.ug. Your ansewr is q_uite corr·ect. =i.owever, since
;y-ou. already underutand that the:Je three things are found
in u spider's thread, I can assume yoLA. have 6istingu.ishecl
oe tvieen them and .kno.~ no,:J they differ· fl"Or..l one another.
L>.;vod.• ~'rue enough. I ml,st know ho' tLeJ d.iffer, otu.er"J~Jis e, ho•:, could I say that the thr:::ad. has 5.11 of them?
Aug. 'J:ll1ererore, with tae same intellect ·ui th wi1ich
you distin[:u,ishej. these properties - once they <:tre Hentally separated., you c&n conceive ler1gth all b;r itself. Gnly
one provision is necessary; that yao.. don't· at the same
time icugine some kind of boG.y, because no Ltatter what the
bod.y ls ~ it v. i l l invar iatly have these ~"'-lal it ies. .I hat I
atl asking ;rou to cone ei v e is an unbodily some t t1inc. taken
~lone, lE-115th can be gr·asped. only by the minu; it ca.nnot
be found. in any body.
~voii. I see.
Aug. L.nd so, if :ro··J. tried, as it were, to ment&ll ..'l
split tnis length lengt:11ise, you coulc not do it. Or, if
you could, it woul6. not be mere length but a lung bod;;r
that; a lsc ~1ad s ome wid. th.
Bvod.. Very trc:.e •
.Aug. ""ccor'Llingly, we ma;;r c;ive t~1is sheer length a
n<:l.me, the name ord.iml.L'il;y ,f';iven it b;y· mat~1ems.ticians, and.
call i"t & line.
£.;vod. 3-ive it any naue :ror. ._ please. I'm not interesteG. in the names of things o:cw3 t~1e 0:cine;s themselve3 ar·e
pe ::•f e ctl~r e::.. car.
,~u,-~. Th.a t' s right. I not only he8.1' :.;ily agree ·.1 i th
youx at~itud.e but Ul\se you. not to r·sudin st&isfiec. ·.•;ith the
name u£ anythinc until you have penetr·~::::teC:. to tile reality
beb.. l11Cl i

u.'

~-:~

r
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CHAPTER VI
The

I~tellect

- An Independent

Subs~ance

Constant experience test1!·ies to the @.bsence of quantity
in our thoughts, no matter what ooject tney represent.

Tne !"act

tna.t our thoughts are never una.ssociated with some quantified
or extended image does not affect tneir "substantial" simplicity
There are many ways in whlch vte can prove tnat tn::>ughts and
extended images are absolutely distinct realities.
1. Deep, internal, intuitive conviction tells us that

the idea we see in our minds iS not the same

~hlng

as

~he

simu~-

taneous image we see in our fancy.
2. An identical idea may be in

mind wlth success-

~he

i vely different phantasms ln the imagination.

3. Tne same phantasm may be 1n the imagination with
successively difr·erent ideas in the mind.

4. we simply know that

~he

objective reality repre-

sented by the idea is unlimited by space and time.
mas' pnrase:
'As is clear t·rom experience, tne
universal realities.'~

In St. Tho-

in~ellect

can .Know

·rvnereas, tne objects depicted by the I·ancy are numerically isolated in space and time.
'The imagination deals with single entities.•2

5. 'iVe also know, by a kind of unlearnt intuition,
t.hat many a reality represented by an idea cannot possibly nave

any body to it.

2?.
Consequently, the quantitative likeness of such

an object would be supert·luous.

Why should the representation

wnich leads us to know a tn1ng include any nmisleading" and unnecessary marks or identirication?
From here on, the task of proving t.ne spiri tual1 ty or· t.he
soul ought to be easy.

We nave berore us a pnenomenon that de-

mands explanation: a real, "mentally t.angible" something, wnich
is so different r·rom everything else in tne world or bodies
tnat we do not even look r·or an account. of its exist.ence r·rom
whatever is tne least bit bodily.
To begin with, thougnts are ev1dent1y tne er·r·ects of some
power residing in the human organism.

~e

nave already seen that

every organism below t.ne numan nas a body wnicn is so united to
another reality, tne source of lir·e, t.hat tne two togetner t·orm
a marvelous compound capable or· organized and at times more than
numan sel!'-moverrient.

However, we also saw tnat, regardless of

now delicate or cumplex tnis vital
~lways

~ctivity

became, 1t cuuld

be 1dentified by one property in t.he ert·ects produced -

ithese ef!'ects were always somehow quantir·ied.
Tnen we came to investigate the human composite of physical
body and vital principle.

Again, many of t.ne products were

eas1l~

measureable in t.enns or size, shape, and mass - unt.il we came to
:vhougnt.

Here we t·ound a rei::l.li ty, just as real as tne tree in St

~ugustlne's

narrat1ve, wnich was

or divisible parts.
vat.ively, simple.

abs~lutely

devoid or measureable

Tne reality was s1mple - integrally, quantiAnd tne question remains: now is tnis strange

r
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err·ect produced?

Tnere l.s no need t.rying t.o explain tnis unquantit'led product as t.ne er·rect. or· man's body alone.

Even though,

'Among all bodle s, tne •noblest. ls t.he body or· man.' 2a
still, as a body,
• • • lt con~ains notn1ng, except. by quant.ltatlve cornmensurat.ion. 1 3
1

Hence, any e!'!'ect it generat.es, wlll necessar1.1y be quantified.
But an explanation ln terms or man's suul as a bundle of
nut.rl t.lve and sense powers 1s equally unsatist·actory.
t.hat.

~ne

Allowing

Vit.al principle o!' an animal ls not. t.ne body lt. vlt.al-

1zes, yet, t ne mere nobill t.y ot' t.his suurce or· ll!'e does not.
save lt. rrom depending upon t.ne body r·or ilis exlst.ence.

Tne !'ol

lowing 1nrerence 1.s ev1.dent: Human life and act.lvit.y are synonyms.

Human lite and existence are synonyms.

And t.nen we see

t.hat not a s1.ngle actlvl t.y of an animal soul - not. even t.ne ragn
est., is unst.ained oy t.ne mu.rks ot

quan~i ty.

tne peak ot' animal productivity, ln every

Sensatl.on, Whicn is

lns~ance

shows signs

or· having passed t.nrougn a vat. out. or· wnich it. always came dyed
Wit.n some color or quanlilty.

Consequent.ly, as t.he animal soul

operates in v1.rtue or it.s union Wl.t.n a Oudy, so it lives and so
it. exist.s.

Given a body, it

Ccin

do all t.nree - operalie, llve,

and exist.; deprived OI a oody, it. cannot operat.e or llve, oecause
it has ceased t.o exist.

St. Tnomas traces t.his quant.1.tat1.ve

adult.erat.ion or· t.ne sensl.t.ive process t.o its pnysical source:
1

Seusat.lon is a power wnicn resides 1n an organ of
t.ne body.' 4

r
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What snould be :mr c onc.tus1on aoou"G t.nougnts and "Ghe r·acul t.y or· t.nought.?

Tnere must., or c uurse, oe some special !'acuJ.t.y

"Go account t·ur tne productlon or aost.ract ideas.

rr· two t'unc-

T..ions as closely allied as nearing a:ld v.tsion are a.1r·r·erent. enough to dernana. cllrr·erent. t'acul t.1es, now mucn more so t.ne r·unct1ons or reeJ.ing and lnteJ.lection?

Objec"Gs

s~ec1ry

racultles.

And t.ne ooject.s or· sensat.lon and of thought. - the !'inal pertec"Gions or productions in which t.helr act.iv1ty t.enninates, are too
r·a.r apart. to be compared.

lis Evodius told St.. Augustine about

Justice and tne tree, "There 1s no comparison between the two. tt
Tnoughts are not. material things; tney are not solid, t.nree
dlmensional bodies t.nat can be weighed and measured.
are sensations.

very well, both or· t.nem are the products of

something more than a gross body.
ln tneir

11

But neither

texture" than this.

But. thoughts are much !'iner

Tney not on.Ly nave no mass -

something common to aJ.l mere bodily energies, out. t.c1ey nave not
even the sem blanca or· mass abou"G t.hem.

And here they are alo!le.

Sensat.ions have not the bulk o!' matter in t.nem, out. they do nave
all tne semblance o:t' ma.-c,ter in their extetlsion, divisible parts
and measureaOiJ.i"Gy.

Tney acquired t.his semblance while passing

tnrough an organ or the body.
·ne can, tnererore, rormula te a guod der·ini tion or· the !'aculty or thought by simply denying it tne distinct.ive reat.ure or
sensation.

St.. Tnomas 1s parapnras1ng Arlst.utle in this rormula:

'The inte.Llect. is an immat.erial (cognoscitive) power
wnich is not tne f'acul ty or a oodily organ.' 5
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Or, in other words:

'The inteilectua~ principle, which is called the mind
or in~eilect, has an independent operation in which the
body has no share.' 6
So far, we have isolated only the

in~eilectual

wnich ph1losophicaliy we call an accident.

racul~y,

But tne argument can

be advanced t·urtner:
'Since nothing can operate independen~ly unless it
according ~a tne maxims that operation
!"rom
being and ~hat every~hing !"unctions propor~ionate to its na~ure - tne conciuslon is ~ha~ ~he human
soul, Which is called tne in~eilec~ or mind, is sornetning
bodiless and 1s self-surricient ln ex1stence.' 7
ls

se1.r·-subsis~en~,
r·~ows
ac~ual

A certain
man's

inte~lect

stand

~na ~

amoun~

or· explanation ls necessary to see wny

may be taken to mean nis soul.

St.. Tnomas uses the word

11

we should under-

inteilect" or "mind" in

two di!'ferent. senses; r1rst, as 'the bodi1.ess faculty wnich produces ana receives abstract

~noughts,

and then, as tne

substantial principle in Whicn this t·aculty inneres.

u~timate

According

to the tirst sense, ne applies the name "mind" in its str1ct
derin1tion; according 'to the la"Lter, his use or tne term is more
suggestive and t·ree.
'fie

can summarize in a few sentences tne !'l.ndings just made

on tne int.e1.1ect.

There must be a principle

C~:i.pable

ot· inde-

pendent. existence 1 wnen experience snows that it. is independent
in its operations.

Tne peculiar independent

t1on is the production or
call

~he

intellect.

though~,

at~rlbuted

ac"Livi~y

in ques-

to a power we

Now, it seems most proper 'to designate the

whole substan'tial source of an activity by its highest, runct1.on.

r

And we do tn1s vmen we call tne human soul, the rnlnd.
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Not every

VlT.a..L numan activity proceeds from the S:JUl alone; nutriT.l.on
ana. sensat.lon, ror example, are mediated thruugn tne body as a
necessary Cb.use wn1cn snares in t.helr productl.on.

V/nen tne

human souJ. ls detached r·rom l."'CS body, tnese runctJ.ons will be
impossl.ble.

Al..L tnat wiJ.l remd.in ln tne sou.L arter tnls detacn-

ment, is the capacity !'or nutrJ.tion and sensation - Wll.nuut tne
capaclT.y ever oelng rea..Lized unJ.ess tne sou..L snou..Ld re-vl.ta.llze
ano1:.ner body.
Wnat. is t.ne re..La t.ion beT. ween tnese lower vi tal po,.vers and
tne r·a.cuJ. ty o!· tnuugnt.?

we na. ve a..Lreaa.y reasuned t.o tae possl-

oi..Ll ty or a separate ex.Lst.ence r·or the int.eJ.lecT.ual part or· a
man's nature.

Can we rignt.ly ca.Ll every power ln man oelow nis

intellect ana. w1J.l, a bOdLLy power?

And may we argue T.hat a..Ll

tnese inr·erior r·acu..Lt.les wl..Ll remain per.Lect.ly S1.er1le arter
soul and body separate because tnere wiJ.l be no body tnrougn
wnich tney can operat.e?
To tne t·irst question, the answer is: tne inT.e.LJ.ect uses
tne ..Lower powers o1· ..Lire on.Ly as a convenient aid, wrn..Le tne
soul animates tne body.

It can r·reely operate wi t.nout real

causa..L dependence UtJOn T.nem because experience snows tuat lt
a.oes.

llnatever is, in the present, can oe in 1:.ne !'uture - pro-

v ia.ed t ne c una.i t ions remain t.ne same.
To tne otner ques t.ion, tne answer 1s SlmpJ.y: yes, on..Ly 1:.ne
lnt..e..LJ.ectual part or· man's suul is or sue n a nature tnat it can
go on ..LJ.ving an independent. lir·e whetner it J.s joined t.o a body

r

or not..

Only t.nis part. ur n.1.s bel.ng 1s t.ruly spirlt.ual.
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Conse-

quent.ly 1 only 'tne m1na. or man 1s capab.Le ur con1..1nued exlst.ence
art.er t.ne cr1s1s in t.uls .Llre called his a.eat.n.

Tne on.Ly ques-

t.lon remains wnet.ner ur not t.ne mlnd, or substant.ial.ty 1 'Cue
suul 1 will ac'tual.ly enjoy t.n1s privllege r-ur wn.Lcn its na'ture
nas dl.Sposea. it..

r
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Possible

~ihilation

}'ra.nuis Suarez e;,uoteo .:>t.

Gregor~r

Of The 3oul

in a

~niver·sal

defini-

tion of d.e a tn:
'Death occurs when tnere i;s a separation of one thine;
frou anotner.' 1
Accor•d.ingly, when a man dies, a cleavaf.;G takes IJlace bet·Jeen his 'body- and soul.

\i

e

~"'-tlO'.'I

ver· y nell \Vha t ha:p:p ens to the

devitulized body afte: the soul leaves
shall. see in a m.or:1ent, goes on

.just &s thouc::;n

nothin,~:

tinued existc:J.CE. ,vJ.lich
~eu;

if it •.,ere,

i~

cape. ole

exerci::3inrc~

3ut tne soul, as we
its noblest functions

haC taken r;lace. ":he ca.pacitJ for con;;e

c.t'cribut~v.

·to it, is ncv·el'

fr~stra-

ae shc1vl·l hcve to deny a rcct p1·inci:ple of

Our ar•gu.m£nt can b8
dOUi.

ic.

O~L

:r.-etucec~

to s.

sec~enc8:

Since the hUUlan

Llmor·tal life, it '.Jill d.C"cu.ully liV8 immortal

ly if there is 3UL.iuicmt reG.son v.ny it s:1oulD. not be an...'1ihilated.
in .:;;t.

Ihere is a
tic 'ce&cilinr; on

.,£:..at follows:

t.'.~

a1Jsolute

· L' i1o 1110. ::; .,, hie; (l

po·~~er·

~f

sunru& r i z e s Scr1olas-

God. tu annihilate any of

r
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It is POt ih:pos>Jible, in tte sense of implying a
::.:ontra d.ic-':Jion, tr1at Cl'ta tur·e::. z~1oul~'- simul ': not exist.
uthervdst: the;r vJoul1 nuvc existed. i:r:ou all., ete1·nitv.
_ Lc:tv1 is c, C-Tod c~o es 1Dt produce ere a tur·e 5 u.ncler· &ny., ._;onstJ.·aint of ;iis EC;..ttLre, .JO th8t ~-~is :pc.Jer- ~.oulcl be C.3t6l·l!1Lle<l to ·\.ihe e:xistence of a crea+;ur·e. It follo·,,s, then,
tr.:.Lc it i>J not i:;c,osGl".Jle for· God to rerluce ·things to
non-exicJsenc.--:;, sinJ£ l·[e Cioea not have to t;ive tr~em existblCe or·ie';inall;;r- except; on t;.i.e supposi'GlO.::l that Fe
f Ol'c ~·.ne.:1 a nC. ;;Jl: c orcl£.. in eG. to ~{ ee -r) them e:x i ::, i: inc: pe rp e tuall2/•' 2
1

ness,

:w can

tence r:hat

~re

easil~r

see t;1a t GoG. woul(i !Lever· blot

of exi::-,;-

rla0 pre,J.estinell to liv: eternall;f • .all ,-,e need

is to finu soue ulear evidence for s·c:.oi1 a

Lie,,

u~.-,_t

p~e~'-e::nination

in t11f c&;;;t=; of man's souJ. ...H.n( v1e llivs it f1·orr. the most r·cli:J.ble witnes:oo <:vailablc-

t~l:J

soul hGrself,

t.::;stif~Ti.ng

abo1.:..t

iwrs elf.
Philoso:pl1ers call thiL

teGtimon~;

v~~~ich

det"..:..nu for- an en1lle 83 life, ti:u; ethic&,l
it

i3

fee~

notLlin::.; else than the
ha]piness. 'Jlhe

univer·sali~;,T

utely cvilent; nol' does it

ti~t:de.

r.:·i1e

~-vllier·

w.1iv31

rl&VE:

Bal

lJl'oves the soul 1 s

ar·f~:wnent.

.l.L:.t<::.r.

~ilor·e

simply,

uesil·e :ior per·-

o:: this ciesL:·e is not h:;r.uedi-co be. It is e;ncu.s(l :LoJ..· u.s

is t:Jat men si1ou..lJ. evo come to Occeive tt1e:;l-

presenc fallc.; ..l staJce,

ie~,

men coulC_ h&vE:

co~1vinccr"

thernselves
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us oi

~hi~

tr~tn

by S<Jecial
::.· evelat iou;:; , in or d.e r· Lo rual: e us
-

mukE:: u;.; consoio:J.s of it - the bEJa:,lfie; ,J..:::sil·e itsel:L. Frow the

d.a\.11 of r E.;nso.n to his last moment, a wan iz literally lur·ec.'

ut. A..1.::;ustine has a c;reat d.Go.l to sa;y about t::-ds inborn
c.t.fJpctite for bcatit-L;_de. In his treatise on 4.:ihe i1ol.y J.:rinity,
he first ObSt...::.;V6S hO'.I lUltniSt<..._,:eacle this v_eSil'C is &Lc: then
:proceJe~

to explain it::: nature,

:";rad.u.&ll~y

le&~lL1,;.:;

his rE:Jader to

conclude; v:ith nLJ v.ltat must be tile si.ngle 1·ealit;y in the
VE.;l'Se

ir.;, VIL1ich

ur~i-

tt:e (les:i.r-e finch:: rest.

'Inste&G. e;:Z .::x:.yinc .:.L..t :. he a.iO., sup!JOSin.: the poet
had. .:::aid: 'All o:;: ;)ro-c:_ wi8il. to -oe h&..>J!Y and. nom.: oi.
;you vii shes to be sad. ' 3.e ;,oulc. ~..;hen hav 2 been vo ic inc a
truth wnich nc one can deny evc.n if he '.:a.m;s to. hhatever
else a person ma;}' Wi~n. to Keep S€Cl'et, thel r_; lb no h1diflG
t~is ~e~ire uhich is ~s co~~o~ly experisnco~ ~s it is
uni ver· ;£ ll J o bse r-v ccc.
"J:he rru:n·vel is, IJ0 1:18VE-l', tho.~ al t.1.ou.,;u thL:> desi~e i::::
so .vicle.s~.:,r&ad, i-L shot<.lu be :::o varied i:1 its :rlanifcst&tio.i:lG • .L'he m;,rstcry, t_L:r·efore, i::: not that ::;A;Ieone i::lOL.le1tV~lere <loes .nc/c. Hant to be hc.c:P:PY, tuc tha·.~ tner·e rv~~l:.y
(,;xi:::>~ reo.:;le, and a
::reu-;~ l118.l1J of Jc rh:il1, ·.r:..u G.o not K::10·;;
.:ilt..t ha)pint~SS L>. :l.i cver·JO!.i.e ..Ltuer:..:;too.::. tnE.:: true nc..turc
of rl8p_;_ir.J.t:foS, \,e :o:;iloulC:_ no-._; hev.:.: th~ spectacle of r:1en tr·,:ing ~c :tinu it in uL1C exe:-·ciae of their minC:.s Ol' the
:~lee~s~.:>..r·e o~~ tGcir· -cocliez ... [18.t :1u vne denie::::,
Gr10~,,11, :Ls
·~L.a0 c: :'-if'S o:.: be&LiitQcle mea.:.13 a life o.Z those thinr;.:. .1~1iCl1
i:1 .~i;_ prest;n:L CXfJel:iGLJ.uc nc: cost c~1joys.' ;::,
~~nnius

r
3C.

t;iVG LL1, life -

vi;.;ies of

ti:1at i"!:i

i:~n-:mlet.ge

"bOC:.;J' cor'rupts,

i:2:

is life. ltl6l'G:fore, hii:J uoblest auti-

anci.. love ar·s sure to

onl~~

cuntinu<~

after· his

t h.e1·e i.0 soracthi!1f:; tc r"eE>tl'ain the

[i.llnihi:::..s.·cion of his soul by Goi.

,:) t.

,;i -~ h

.L.

ho;llaS , we

;;;a

;y t il8. t

Goa will not :r· e luc e anythi.i.l{;

to non-exist::;nce once .tie ha2 predestined it to inmortcility •

mers capa..;it;y of a

.((1e

sure ic;;;

ac·~·--~.c..l

~r1ins

fulfil1r::ent •

fc:r· per·petuc:.:.l life .1ill not in.i.~o

le.ss 1s -'c1·ue witi1 the hL:r.J.an

t;nou;Sht :process ::lear·-

spirit. J:ts inc:.q;enC.ent o;·e::.ation in tl.ll
l~T

Ul'gues to its ab ili t.;· to su..llsis t alone

~.ut

&Hcl

-.vi chou·t; a bod.y.

V·.ill it res.lly J.o so'? It i:J not enol+';h to sa.; ttat ,}od

b.<::..l Cces"c:i.neci it to an
s ir::::;le L..C t o£ 1nan' s
God shoul\l

~.ish

ac~or·

·.:rle Clor,! '[e r·eueives in

life.

wo1·~:;

irlfs love wo'J.l·i

onl~,

to JeE;

w~1etr~er

::1.

Ghan eX:Jla in \my

to e;::.·eute s.n intelligent be·r. . g

soul • . e have r. . m.
~JO sit i

ii.1't~Ol'·:~aJ.

lik~;..

trle hu.man

u SlJil'itua.l substance

v c l~r i unun de inn or "GC..li ~~-'.

Tht: C<:,Ji<...:.ci't;::: for et e.r·naJ.. life L1 man 1 ;:, Jcul n8. t L.l'ully
:ilov.:;("

ll.S

to looA fo:..' acme ciivinc

•H'Oi1lise

tna.t .i.L ;,oulu be

fu..l:t ill ed. .;e foun.l ti:.. is pr·ouis:::: in our na t·u.1· s.l 6. 'c;Sir·'--: for· 1- srfeuc clC:..:ppirL-3:.:.:.

·.~ill

..:.or~tinue

neyom.~

tt1L }JOint

livin,·; into

t:l6l'8

eternit;~.

is no

nee·.~

:Cor f:u·ther

If t:1er·e is <..J.ny clcubt about

3 r•(

.

t L:E. concept ac it come::, un ts us from conGe iousness. rermanence

i3 indispcnsc.. ole to tl1e complete notion of hap:9iness. In one
place,

~t.

fhomas

~oes

so far as to identify the de8ir8 for

beati0"LLG.e ,dth tha desire fo1· e:ternity.
'A nat"l.t:::.'al desire cannot pos:3ibl~· be f1·ustrated • .lUll:.
1uan naturally v,rants 1.0 live for·ever • .ie can pr·ove this b~
a kind. of syll Of{ iSm: ~<is tenu e is s or11e tniru; whiC~l every
beinr; G.esires ••• ~ioweve1·, man co,;,.1ceives b.:-' his intellect
not only present existence &s Enir:lals do, but existence
witho'..l.t qur:i.lification ••• 1:.,an vJill, ther·.::::fore, en,io;y in hi:::
soul the lifs o::: eter·nit;y voihich nis mind anticipates.' 4

r
3fo.

Lan' s

There

~18.

D0~t

·:l. t::; be

not only can but will be

his d.eJ.th.

~as
~t.

that

~his

i:hun1&S

Of God

en obvious Lrpllcc.. tion in ·.mn t

on the Ciesire fc.:c beJ.tituC..e

)lication

J:'o~ session

iny - ':l he

VV~liCh

CO!lV.i.!.l.Ceu US that

ind~pendent

of

fut~~8

';11&8

sa iu

OlU'

SOUlS

tihlE. :he im-

desire is not re&lized by anyone before

e~it01nizes

t(lis comrnon experience:

'~veryone is acreed in calling baatit~de ~ome kind of
l!e:c•fect good •.o.nd ,,e ma,y :.leiine "Cue lJerfect good. as that
Y;hich contDins no cdmixture of evil; li:::.. e a pe1·fectly
~hite object i~ one th~t bhow~ no traces oi ~lack. But
man, in his :r_:;1·esent state, cannot bs entir·ely fr·ee ll:Ohl
evils; .not bo~lily evils s·J.ch & s i1unger-, thirst ana. cold nor spiritual evils. :~here is not a ms.n livin{ who is not,
at least SOL!eth1es, distu.r·bed b;y hi.s inor·dinate ):-l&Ssions,
Viho io not occasionally d.eceive:l cr·, e:d) any rate, :Lails
to 1.::..aderstand Yvbat nc ''.ould lL~c; to know o:::·, finally, ·sho
nmst :r-ena.in c;ontent with a vatil'-e oninion on iiiipor·t<:mt
tr·r;_ths ·,Jhich he '.,ouLl lil~r to com_pr·ehe~1c'.. ~·iith ceJ:'t<:l.inty. '1

One problem is still le.::.:t

uB • . • e

nave to lully examine the

na turt:: of bap:pineds. ::::his examination is, of cour·se, with a
view to
leaCi

foretellin~;

u:Lt~r

what kind of life the t.Uin::\n sp.:.l'it will

its det2.c!1ment irom trw body • .ie are entirel;y justi-

f i ed ill isola tin; a.:J.c:.. analyzin{; the single concept of hE p:pines3

unC. pls.ce • .Esse .1:;cs
.
an:.;. r.wtures are eteu1al

thi.n~~s.

,,he-t iG

essential to hapiJ iw:. ss today, in even one Elan, is es se.ntial to
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iwp:p ine s;;;o; irL all a~ses Stnd. pl& c es and b eyo.u.d mec.su.r;eable di stan-

c as a nO. t irae s •

a iefinition, we shall
tents,

anc~

t:1:.:: definition, analyze j_ts ucn:l-

in this vJay comt:. to an unu.:.;aall:.· iull und.erstanJ.ing

of the life of a

vc:.:·dion,

assc.~Lte

separ&~aJ

Gpi~it.

Aur;ustinc Jeiin€U t:1c nsture of happineos fr·om

.::>Jli.

its positivs anG.. negative .side.
'To -~e happy rs s j_ ·:1Jl · n:..;.:; to be in ·want
it means to b0 wise. 1 2

u~·,

Hi

o"'Jner

word..:i,

'£o be nappy is to be wise. 1.1o be baatifi.c&llJ happy is to 1Je
to the

wi;J8

::1an

lir;.;.i~

accor~.L.nr;

- '.'ihere tne li.Jitation is

measurc;c~

fc,:.:· each

to t£16 plans of .2rovidc:.ace upon nis soul.

It is aertainly evid.en·(; th2.t J;Jeriect joy must consist in
the possession of

somethint~

tlanger of losing i t .
thing

a..:1u..

B·~.rt;

extremely e,ood, vvithou.t

least

t :.1 '-~ chm act e:r· of thL; e::..:tremel.;- '-';ooc-:.

the way in Vihich it will be po .35 es sed -

not been evitle.rTb to r_ca.n:

thl;

1

CLese

i:1a v e

o:L the ce3t :nind.:::; in histor';f •.hcco.:c-d-

.int; to ;Jt • ..:1-gustine's definibion, a person ii.:3

callint_: a rr;an ·.;ise, ws ILtco...n to say

tr·~at

;:l&_;._J}j~

hE: holll.G

i.L~

tec0.u.s.;

his mine_

n~;:;
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oi th3

tr·ut~1

tht:1·efore

,,,lOS8 :possession not only maKes a

[JB.P:P.f,

but so CCJL};·letely :Lillo his

n~&n

iflir~c~

',;i.Ge and.
Y:i th wision1

that hiE; wealth is O.i.10li,_,h to last uinl fo:.:' etornit,yi

:::;~,t1onymous.

' !hen v10 love a til ir..t- fo:r the d&l:~c of someti:ing else,
this othe~ object mu~t be loved only fo~ its8li because
,_e calu1ot assume WJ. endless series o.L obj<::cts d82ired by
tas natl~r-al dl;J,;etite, \vtH;I'e c&.ch ~ning is de.:J:i.r·ed ::::or tne
sake of 2no·cher te;yronu it but non-J for· its elf. '.l:o L.lake
su::;h an ass:..:ui.:pl;ion is ey_u.ivalcntly to,dent that raan has
& natv_r·c:..l Cl es lre u t a 11. 1
since exp3ricnct anJ re&son tell us thtit an appetite remain3
um,ioved until its <:-itt-ent:i.on is focused. upon one object.
'li'ow, i1 v1e analyze all the practical sciences, artc and
facul tie:J, voe ar.IB.ll :Linci one -;:;nin{; comLon to <.:.11 of
them; ·vJitiwut excep1:iior.:., -:;hey cir·e d.esir·eC_ alll-, used only
for· the sah.e of sor~wt:J.inf~ above themselvea • .i'heir· objective is not kno;jlc.dt;c itself but sor:tE; Kind. o::: func-tion or
ope::.·c;, t ic:n •
.:>pecu.lc:.tive sciences, on tne ot~er hanc, &re vs.luE::d
for anci in t he1,1sel ve s. '.l' he L.• ob je cti ve or· e1.:.C. id Lno·,,ledc, e
i·cself anc1 thi::: end i8 ezclusivel? theL·~, ;:;ince among
-~ll ht.rilli.l1 endeavor·;:; no ott1er c:..o-~ivi-0y but is a mectns to
some!ji:::i.n:::_: ili<:Sher· "Jt:..<m itseli - e:z.cepli 3-peculc',tivo r·eflEction. lionae ,;u.ent ly, sin·Jc ph;. c J..; icc: 1 pur•s,~i ts ar·e Qirec ted
&n(~~ 8ubor•(iinc:.too. to tre llleditative, every 8_ction th::=:1:i a
man _prn:Zor·ms nuturall;y ;;:;uoser·ve~ the contemplative ]JO •• u-s
01. hi;:; Hl:i.nc'~. ' .:,
~1Wilan

'.l'his £nalysis of

God is
-rur·n to

hW1Jar.~.

desires io based on

l_.h(j

:;ali:~

ve-r·· :jable hier·druhy o:L :fJOwer·s, each contriblLting in

&

<3

povJ.;r· above it, c:nd th3 whole series contl:ilr..Lting to

tn8

a~~~van~a,_;E

itself.1,~an

ot: the organize<i substance
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is no ex-

ception vO this axiorr, of cr·eate'"l natures • .ie need hardly mor·e
than a fe1• fects fJ:'OW ex-oe:...'ience to reco,:_;;nize tnis hierarcny
of faculties within him. :St.

parai';I·aph. 'l'he

~1ip:hest

Ln.m:an facv.lty,

\',hic~1

its

p~rely

r~ilec~ive

'.l:~wmas

preawned o.c1

tl.lSC

facts for

huma:1 s.ctivity be:::.ongs to the i1ic;hest

ex})erience 8_e&in tE-ll.s

UG

is the mi.ncl in

cs.pacity.

'rT!he life Wtlich is proper to man, as li.1&n, i;:;; thE: life
the mind. It is rnE..n's reason which ultiraately rnf:lkes him
VH18 t
he i s • ' -1

o

r:o',veve.r:, we may ccnsiO.cr the

r~:::o.son

or· min-5. i.u t:vo vvays: eitn01·

'by itself o:::' in itiS iafluence upon ot£1er faculties.

''J.'akint; rll..ln's reason in its i.!1fluenti~l phase, vle call
cer·tain actio1:1.:s rational bt:cause the ::::'et:..son d.rav:s them out
and p;u.ides them after· tney arE: d.::'v.an ou':i cf })Otency; but
Nr"eri we sa;; that there is some activity in man Vihicn is
r1-.. tional by it3 ver·y .na.t1.1.re, we mean ths.t its perfection
iz :..'cached in the re&sonintc; or think.ing process itself.
Gnly tni.:3 latter· open:tion is st:r:iutl;; :::·ational because
,.,ru:..tever is name'..L from its O\'Jn natLu·e is yrior to that
which is named. :;:roEJ. anotller· thiu; that aff ectu it. Hov;,
since hJ:,ppiness is man's hi,,;hest 2:0od, it must necessarily
oonsist in a h u..~Sn activity ·vmich is essentiblly and not
just :rinflue.ntially~: intellectusl. Before all else, therefore, hap:p ines ... is b. life o:,: contem:pla tion l'a ther than of
e:r~te1· na 1 a c-c i vi ty, and consists in the exercise of man's
1· eas OL or· inte 11 e c t rather t r:£.n his vdll (or any other
powe~) under the guidance of reason.' 5
It locs no·t really rnu t;:;er .;nether men in c:;s.neral would
ctgree v1ith Aristotle's analysi.J of

.r. .<qlpiness.

t11at ha11Diness is the :possession o1 the
good, but the agreeL:H:nt G.issolves <just

11.ll 'Nill

tli[~hest
b.S

at_~1·ee

conceivable

soon as men begin to

identify this hit)1est conccivabl;:; good.. l'nl;;' t£wsc who are

speciali:JtF.: i!::c the anc::,to.II.\} of
7

ilt:..man
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faculties ar·e in a position

to d.ecla:'E: J.ogm2.ticall~· on mc:.n' s r1i[;hest pcss ession. J?aoul ties
ar·e powers, and pov1ers are vest> els \1hose ·:size" and.

1

'shape' 1

d.cter•mines ho>J ruuoh of w:u"t }cind of perfec;tion vvill flow into
the soul. ~renee, in dcclarin__; that man's intellect is alone dispo::vcd. to receivE: the most of the best '-c::oou.ness which a L.an can

acs.uire, v~e ar'e declarine: an L1ference that is not; drawn from
the exper·ience of men bt:_t ::::::rom the experience of man as he a:ppears to the minds of Aristotle, s.nC:.. Sts. ~,.ugustine anu Thomas.
,; e a.r c nea 1· tn e en C.. of our invest iea tion. '::akint_: up
.r'msustine' s de~ini tion -~.i.WC n·or'e, ;:;1nCJ<: h'--~lJ:;Jhlcs:: is the enjoyment of \vis c.lom an1 perfect b.o. pp iness is its perfect enjoyment,
He have only to U.iscover the nature of that inef:L&ble object
the men tal possess ion of which pr ocluce s in turn wisdom, enjoyffient and perfect

ha~piness.

'fhe intellip:ible obJeolJ of beatiiic wisdom ll1U3t be a personali ty. ;ie are easily, c.lmo st i.1.1st inc t i v .:;l_y, sure of chis at least a~te r reviewing the 6_is:propo:L·t ion ·oetw een how much can
be known a bout persons and about. dll oth E:r things in tne universe :vhicn are less Jchan personal. ':rhc.i.l we are given a choice of
-chree ways o:L identifyint: this personality.
We ffiB..JI e;o through the vary in,:,; grades of personal b ei.ngs
until we fincl one

Vi{lOse

natur·e i;~ so exalted tha-:.; to undE:::·stand

him is to kno1-~ every other person and r.~.un-pe::::c;on in the ifiOrld.
Or we may concentrate our- attention only on tt1e f<J.c,J.lt;y of human
thought, senarate its povierE, ai.1d then decide r;hat sin[;le objE:ct

is so utterly .K.nowable that to

43.
it enter the mind is to sur-

r~ve

feit tre mind's capaci·Gy for· knowledge. Or, finally, we may look
back into ou.r mentt...l experience and recall every person, hUI:lnn
livinc~

and more than nwnan,

and dead, about v-1hom we nad every

thou[;ht. 'iiilich of these reflections was accompunied by the keenest pleasure<: Once again, we are privileged to say that the :personality who c;ause1 us the t:;rea test :pleasure in ti1inking of him,
is the same one whom we shall contemplate for eternity • .ldter
all, our minds are not changed at death, except for the better.
;/n.&tever Knowledc:se is most deeply enjoyable on earth T._;ill also be
the rnos:;

enjo~'~lble

sfter cteatn. r;:h2 depth of jo.J will certainly

be increased for each species or kind of k.no,vledr':e, but the :proj)Ortion between the
;~e

knowable

moHled~;es

themselves will remain the same.

may follo'iJ Gt. 'i:horfJaS towards iden tifyint.£ the most
personalit~v,

accordin5 to

t;he first of thte:Se \'lays.

'Intellectual activities a1~e not onl;y fir'st recognized
by the ob ,j ects ·vvh ich are known, b•J. t they ar s s :, so specified
or gradeu accorG.in&; to these objects. Conseciu..ently, an
intellectual op e:r.·r;tion is c.s much more exnlted. ;3.S the ob,ject
perceived is inore :r;erfect; so tho..t, ·~he most :p,_:_rfect kind
of intellE..C~ion Jnea1!3 the und.er·ctandllli~ of the most :perfeotly knowable being, ':vhich is C'rod. 1 6
And why is God. t.he ruost 1u1owable? :decause He is infin.Ltely actt:..al. The mind. c8n perL:eivc nothin; else
Ol'

,.;is'lom L:3 "t ht· indwellin,g of be

simply "baing:r in a mental

in:~

·chu~

actw:::.lity.

·~r·uth

in the mind. ,Jisd.om is

st~:tte.

The s oconct posaible way of learning v,b.o the :personality is
that ·,,ill .'i;ivc us eter·n;:,.l happinE:J2S, is to examin(; our fBculty
of thout:;ht • .u':xamining tile r6ach of its

11ov~ers,

1ae can decide on

some one ob,ject '.'/hose ve:'y nature is sufficient to c'eplete the
intellect ·with knowledge • rihen .Aristotle obser-ves that:
'Yen's intellect is of su.ct... a charact-:;r
come;:; a 11 tL1ings.' 7

th~:.t

it be-

he is telling us th&t tnere is absolutely no intelligible reality vvhiCtl o-:.n minds canno"c receive
The (_lUestion is, whl..;b

or~e

amonc~

bc;come pe1·fecteci by.

<:.i:

"li~H~se

in:Linitel:y m.w-nerou.s

re<:.J.lities can so fully sc..tisfy tile in1ieJ lect that. any furtner
"s:pec·u.l&tionn is no lor. . c?;er J.esil·ed becaU':lG it is no lonf;c.r neceszctry. uuar·ez

~~lves

the ansv;er in a Sdort 1efere.nc8 to ;st.

Grecory Nazianzen.
'Of cll i.atelll,:.o;iole ~hings, at the hi,;-;hest Eitlf.1:nit
is C;:od, in i!hon. eva;y d.E-.3il·e simply comes to a standstill
ancL is made iw.ELoveo.bl e. lro mind, ~.ovvt.ver comprehensive or
inquisitivE. can ue car::-·ie6. an~rldJ.ere beyc.nd ~Um. It never
can nor s·vr::.r: v,ill conceive an;y object hic:;her than }iim in
su.bli'rli ~:;. i 1 his is the extreme of all thinf.~3 that can bs
striven for; ·ni.1cn ';~e :.:eu.cl1 1iim, every yea.rnin,; 01 Olu·
s:peol~lative so1..<.l8 oume::.; to a pe1·f<:ct :rest.' 8

1he last means we have of knov:ing v.rhom ue Ghall
c...fter df;ath, is to compare

Olu

find

enjoyablt:.

Ollt:

that

v~aa

the

n~ost

contempli:~tt

pust mental experiences u..atil

the ob ,je c t of our' t hough ts du1· :Ln:

ti:J.i.

)e

.~

Vie

cc...::1 say beforehamt iJl.lat

r· e:fle c s ion must have be en

so;:cw pc,rsonnl beir.J6 • .Ju.b the p1·oof ::3top.:;;

he:~e.

~he

secr(jts o:.L

t;2w riLin:.l ara knmm only to oa ch mau hir.1self anC to tb.ost; v r.:1:1
fe

v.l tt. whor.1 he is vdll in,;;

must b8 t;.iE owr1 jucit;e in t
e11c ss of ot;hers only to

bor·l:oweC. conviction::· •.

-:-..o

~liS

thf~

sha1·c them.
matter

an~

~heJ.' 1Jfore,

eve1yone

G.epencl on the exper i-

extent of coLI irmL:.1tj !lis mm un-
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of the joy~; pos sibl"- to a man on ~arth. -.nd then he vvas bl\JS sed

see:r1l t0

be nea:r.>i11{;

o~J.r::olves

in~:teacl

of him, when we r·eucl v,:Jat

hs 3ays:

dr elic~1ed is the man Vi ;10 kuows all otn er things and
does not knoJV ~'hee. but harrp~r is hs that knc'. ..J .lh0e,
-':;r.ou{';h •1C:: 1.oes not ~mor. trH::I::le • .tine~ if he snould knm botb
them anci lLlec, he L:~ not tne r!appier for· 1~llOr;ing the111,
but is b..a:9py onlJ because ~1e knows :2hee. r J
11

46.

B;_,~

way of epilogue,

·-t1e

ca...'1 :profitable maKe a few ooser-

iHJJOrtE~lit ~'l

w,t ions on the study of

t !n t we h<lve J'J.St finished.

l'il"st of all, the:r·e is the c;;,uesT;ion of method. 'i.'hroughout
the thesis, .r...o Llorc than pass i.ng reference

Jcholas tic doctrine on

r:1s.~ct

v~as

er an .. forrn, which

1aade to the
seeL~s

to under· lie

any :proo:!.: for t!1e spil•ituality o£ the human soul. Uffhan/;, it
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